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The Prescription Drug Pricing
Moment: Using Public Health
Analysis to Clarify the Fair
Competition Debate on Prescription
Drug Pricing and Consumer Welfare
Ann Marie Marciarille
Introduction
The American Public Health Association tells us that
“[p]ublic health promotes and protects the health of
people and the communities where they live, learn,
work and play.”2 It further distinguishes public health
concerns from clinical health concerns by the latter’s
focus on the individual’s special circumstances. When
it comes to prescription drug cost and access, both the
health of the community and the health of the individual may be implicated. Even individual prescription
drug access has a collective element, in that we do not
typically purchase or acquire prescription pharmaceuticals as individuals until the very last stage of distribution: retail sale. Rather, the journey of a prescription drug from manufacturer to individual consumer
occurs in stages, most of them highly intermediated
by collective contracting by a pharmacy benefit manager or by the government before the pharmaceutical
reaches the level of retail distribution. This pre-retail
sale collective phase of pharmaceutical acquisition
and distribution has direct and serious implications
for pharmaceutical cost and access for all.
In pharmaceutical pricing and distribution we find
ourselves at the intersection of collective and individual health concerns in the United States. The recent
price spikes in pharmaceuticals present problems of
access and affordability that rise to the level of a public
health challenge. Because we consume pharmaceutical drugs individually according to our unique health
profiles, we experience problems of cost and access
individually. Nevertheless, pricing and its attendant
access and affordability concerns are at the intersection of two important values that have always been
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central to public health: community health and individual responsibility.

Antitrust
American antitrust law has its own analytical axis on
which to examine the organization of pharmaceutical
manufacturing firms and the structure of their industry. This axis is found in the debate over the definition
of consumer welfare. Antitrust considers one definition or calculus of consumer welfare that includes
savings that do not redound to the pharmaceutical
consuming public directly and also considers a second that excludes those savings that do not redound
directly to the pharmaceutical consuming public.
Professor Stephen Salop, for example, offers a vision
of consumer welfare that resonates with public health
analysis. He argues that a “true consumer welfare
standard would condemn conduct [that] reduces the
welfare of buyers, irrespective of its impact on sellers.”3
He argues that efficiencies that redound elsewhere
should only be found relevant to this calculus if such
efficiencies are eventually passed through to consumers.4 Antitrust analysis also offers a competing definition of consumer welfare, one that values efficiencies
that are not necessarily passed through to the pharmaceutical consuming public but, rather, retained by
the pharmaceutical firm for the research and development of new products or returned to its shareholders
and investors.5
Thus, fair competition law and public health law
talk past each other when discussing pharmaceutical
pricing and distribution. The former cannot agree on
the relevant definition of consumer welfare. The latter does not fully comprehend the highly complex but
inherently collective nature of pharmaceutical drug
acquisition in the United States.
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What might public health analysis contribute to
the current roiling debate6 over pharmaceutical pricing and, in particular, about solutions consistent with
American values? This essay proposes to inject public health discourse into this debate to enrich it, focus
it, and render it more accessible to those who must
live by its outcome. As David Blumenthal and David
Squires have pointed out, drug pricing is having its
moment,7 and this attentive moment is long overdue.

Understanding Our Collective Acquisition of
Pharmaceutical Drugs
It is a truism of American pharmaceuticals that what
you pay is determined by who you are. Such price
discrimination8 is embedded in the American health
care landscape of multiple overlapping health care
systems, each designed to serve different populations
and each designed to cross-subsidize cost and access
to pharmaceuticals for some by others.
The history of our systems of pharmaceutical pricing is astonishingly complex. A few lessons may be
gleaned from its origins in our multi-layered combining of different health care systems onto each other.
Our pharmaceutical pricing regimes can be seen as
the fullest flowering of our commitment to three principles: free market rewards for innovation, our commitment to prioritized preferential access to pharmaceutical drugs for certain populations, and our
comfort with market-governed exclusion from access
to certain pharmaceutical drugs for other populations.
Seen in this light, the tradition of the Veterans Administration in — for example — leading the way as the
low price leader, by custom and by statute, on domestic pharmaceutical acquisition cost, is the modern version of Abraham Lincoln’s motivation in founding the
Veteran’s Administration in 1865, “…to care for him
who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and
his orphan.”9 By extension, all modern government
programs that benefit favored groups with preferential cost and access to prescription drugs — whether it
be veterans, or the “deserving poor” in non-Medicaid
expansion states, or some lower-income individuals in
Medicaid expansion states — have a connection to this
history of favored pricing for their group.
While it is fascinating to consider the rationale for
favored-group pricing for pharmaceuticals, it is as
important to consider who is not in that category. In
the modern era, it is most particularly Medicare beneficiaries.10 The “why not” here may be the most significant story to tell.
Direct price negotiation for pharmaceuticals has
never been a consistent enduring part of the Medicare
program.11 Medicare’s exclusion from the groups of the
insured that are allowed to bargain to reduce pharma46

ceutical drug acquisition cost as a tool for improving
prescription drug access and affordability, is the direct
result of representations made and deals struck to
ensure pharmaceutical industry non-opposition both
to the Medicare Modernization Act in 200312 and to
the Affordable Care Act in 2010.13 Thus low and lower
income Medicare beneficiaries are at the mercy of the
market (in Part B infusion therapies used to combat
cancer, for example), and (in Part D) at the mercy of
the negotiating power of their insurer and their insurer’s pharmacy benefit manager — if they can afford to
get themselves inside this tent.
Medicare Part C, sometimes called Medicare Managed Care, is commercial insurance sold through a
structured marketplace where the insurers may engage
in direct bargaining for pharmaceuticals. Medicare
beneficiaries who are not poor enough to be eligible
for Medicaid but who are not rich enough to purchase
a robust Part D plan make up a significant portion
of the Medicare Part C enrollment population.14 The
non-trivial public health concerns raised by elders
who sacrifice all to pay their Part B premiums, Part D
premiums, and Medicare Supplemental Insurance for
fear of tightly managed care are sobering. The love of
narrow networks and tightly constrained formularies
is not strong in the Medicare population, making Part
C enrollment a last resort for many so enrolled.15
On the commercial insurance side, we can also see
direct bargaining but with fractured buyer power.
Perverse incentives are generated by pharmacies’ and
pharmacy benefit managers’ (PBMs) working off of
a business model based on a percentage of cost and
price along with dispensing fees. These lessen the likelihood that commercial insurers, PBMs, or commercial pharmacies will rise to full-throated discussion of
the effects of pharmaceutical pricing and distribution
systems on cost and access for individuals.
Different solutions are likely appropriate for different problems in different segments of the pharmaceutical market. As Rena M. Conti has pointed out,16 the
problem of price spikes in generic drugs, where the
government can do so much more to entice generic
drug manufacturers into the marketplace, is undoubtedly different from credible solutions to the price spike
in branded drugs first to market with true innovation.
This problem is also different from any credible solution to price spikes in pharmaceuticals that, however
new to the market, are being sold into a drug universe
where there are other therapeutic equivalents available at radically different price points.
In this last group, experiments with different forms
of reference pricing or grouping drugs into categories
based on therapeutic effect and moving only those
drugs that have a distinctive therapeutic effect into
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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higher priced categories, have gained some traction
in other countries and in commercial insurance in the
United States. More politically palatable and thereby
perhaps more possible than government price setting, reference pricing merits further consideration. It
attempts to balance the welfare of the group in promoting pharmaceutical innovation with the interest
of the group in promoting affordability and access.
Public health analyses weighing these two competing
values can enrich the conversation. Reference pricing attempts to thread the needle between reasonable
reward of innovation and unreasonable restrictions
on access.

Considering Daraprim
Turing Pharmaceuticals’ (Turing) Daraprim (pyrimethamine) frames the issue of how to address the
5,000% price increase of a decades-old drug most
widely known for the treatment of toxoplasmosis.
Daraprim is a sole source drug. Turing’s price increases

of sole-source market position produced a product
unavailable to many who lacked insurance or were
under-insured.
Important work has been done by Michael A. Carrier, Nicole Levidow, and Aaron S. Kesselheim on the
antitrust implications of Daraprim production and
distribution.17 Turing’s behavior around Daraprim
may give rise to a monopolization claim with a focus
on the changes made to the drug’s distribution system to keep rivals from entering the generic market
with a competitor product.18 More interesting, for the
purposes of this essay, is whether either the Daraprim
price increase itself or the exclusionary re-configured
distribution system can be said to harm public health
and consumer welfare.
Daraprim has been eligible for generic development for close to 50 years. No generic had entered
this market. It illustrates that the cost of a modestly valued drug may be substantially enhanced by
a drug distribution mechanism that defeats generic

As a public health matter, the FDA has announced its intention to prioritize
generic drug applications on sole-source drugs. What is lacking in public
discussion is mention of the public health implications of rendering a
curative sole source drug unaffordable to those with no other option.
The discussion, instead, is cast as an individual’s problem of cost and ccess.
Lacking a vocabulary for the kind of harm we all suffer when a therapeutic
alternative is effectively removed because of its extraordinary acquisition cost,
antitrust law can learn from public health that the consumer welfare
on prescription drug pricing in the United States is collective.
were accompanied by a re-design of Daraprim’s distribution system to a single distributor: Walgreen’s. The
drug was little known because of the relative rarity of
its use. The story of how it became so lucrative to its
manufacturer can be read as the story of a sole-source
supplier and supply limited to a distribution network
that essentially worked to constrict supply to those
seeking to investigate development of a generic bioequivalent. The product was deemed by many to be
without significant value or potential for significant
return on investment. This offers, at the very least, a
compelling story of how to maximize return. It also
offers an opportunity to stop and consider how our
goals are balanced betweeen reward of innovation
and production of therapeutic products for public use. Daraprim’s scenario gives pause. There was
no substantial biochemical innovation. The gaming

entry. Daraprim reminds us that the general rule that
increased competition will discipline sudden price
spikes depends on that new entry being “timely, likely,
and sufficient.”19 Turing’s re-priced Daraprim and reconfigured Daraprim distribution system has already
existed long enough to have made the changes highly
profitable. Indeed, a competing generic entry, at this
point, could hardly be said to be timely from the perspective of drug costs. Many millions of dollars have
been wrung out of the drug acquisition system on an
overnight price spike.20
A crucial variable in promoting competition for
generic eligible pharmaceuticals is supposed to be to
keep the opportunities for generic entrants open.21
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) data tells us that
the more generic entrants, the more price competition,22 at least to a point. None of this contemplates a
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sole source price spike combined with a distribution
mechanism designed to delay generic entry to make
new entry untimely. If such exclusionary behavior is
not to prove both lucrative and replicable, antitrust
law needs a different definition of timely entry. And it
may also need a more focused definition of consumer
welfare to talk back to distribution system innovation
designed to suppress competition.
Public health can help antitrust law find this vocabulary and legal analysis. Turing’s innovation was in learning how to game the generic entrant system to delay or
divert new entrants for an expensive interval. Antitrust
law will need to determine if this is the kind of innovation that brings efficiencies. As a public health matter, the FDA has announced its intention to prioritize
generic drug applications on sole-source drugs.23 What
is lacking in public discussion is mention of the public
health implications of rendering a curative sole source
drug unaffordable to those with no other option. The
discussion, instead, is cast as an individual’s problem
of cost and ccess. Lacking a vocabulary for the kind of
harm we all suffer when a therapeutic alternative is
effectively removed because of its extraordinary acquisition cost, antitrust law can learn from public health
that the consumer welfare on prescription drug pricing
in the United States is collective.

5.

6.

7.

Conclusion
Public health’s recognition of collective as well as
individual interests in affordability and access offers
a vocabulary that fair competition law might be able
to use. It could power a consumer welfare analysis of
market gaming behavior that extends beyond shifting pharmaceutical acquisitions costs to other payers
and, in fact, effectively sets public health priorities. The
reality is that our pharmaceutical drug budget is not
infinite. Elevated prices for some pharmaceuticals thus
reduce access to other pharmaceuticals for everyone.
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